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Draft Recommendation
on prospedsfor space cooperdion betvreen Europe and fapan
The Assembll,,
(t) Considering the interest spac€ cooperation bet\r'een Europe and Japan presents m scientrfic,
technological and rndustnal terms and also rn strategic terms:
(t, Regretturg that many drfficulties of vanous krnds on both sides have so far prevented an)'progress on
such cooperation;
(nt) Welcoming the major advances Japan has made rn space rr recent )'ears.
0, Notrng that Europe's and Japan's interests, budgets and pnonties as regards space development are
broadly srmrlar;
(r) Consrdenng that Japan has actueved autonomv in some areas of its space actintres, which could enable
it to reconsider rts dependence on the Uruted States and seek more balanced forms of cooperation allowing rt
to play a more active part on the mtemational stage,
(w) Regrettrng that pressure from the Uruted States rr ts commercial dealings, ur practrce prevents
European satellrte manufacfurers from gaimng acc€ss to the Japanese market, despite the latter's concem to
remaur open to rntematronal competitron;
(vn) Deeplt' regretting that the European Space Agency as )'et has no office rr Tolyo to represent it and
build up rts relations urth Japanese govemment agencies;
(wu) Commendrng the European Busuress Community in Japan, and notabll, its Space Subcommrttee, for
the u'ork it has done, wT th financral support from European rndustry', the national Chambers of Commerce rn
Japan and the European Uruon, to promote cooperation and coordination between these various organisations,
actrrg as their spokesman in contacts wrth the Japanese authontres;
(rx) Also notmg rnith rrterest Japan's growmg tendency to strengthen rts capabilitv for rntematronal action,
particularly rn the mrlitary sphere;
(x) Welcomrng the fact that Japan rs urcreasmgly ginng higher pnont-v to its contnbutron to rnternatronal
secuntl', particularll' to Uruted Natrons peacekeepurg operahons;
(n) Noturg that Japan maintams regular contact wrth the North Atlantrc Treaty Orgarusation;
(xu) Considenng furthermore the interest wrth wtlch the Japanese Muustry for Forergn Affairs is followtng
WEU rmtiatives in developing a European space-based observatron system;
(xnr) Considenng the rmportance of the current debate in Japanese society on the expediency of Japan
acquinng an rndependent earth observatron capability for security and defence purposes;
(ni Notrng that the arguments put fonvard for possessrng such a capability are identical to those that have
led Europe to take simrlar decisions;
(xv) Auare that a project such as thrs must have the fullest public support and that the pubhc must be
mformed and rnvolved rn drscussions leading to decision-making;
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(m) Takrng note, finally, of Japan's Earth Observation Centre and its prograrnme for burldrng a data relay
test satellrte, both of which correspond to actrvrties and prolects of major interest to WEU,
RECOMMENDS THAT TFM COUNCIL
I . Urge member states to develop a corrrmon space strategy which, in uerv of the exstrng opporturuties
for cooperatron u.rth Japan, wrll give the European space industry access to the Japanese market, takrng rnto
account all relevant Japanese agencies and mstitutions, thereby allowrng tcchrucal and ndustnal contacts to be
established at appropnate levels;
2. Propose that the European Space Agency open a permanent office u:r Tokyo, thus palrng the way for
permanent and thorough dralogue unth Japanese goverrrment agencies, and that the national space agencies of
member states strengthen bilateral tres wrth Japan;
3. Discuss lvrth the Japanese methods of rmproving cooperatlon betu'een Europc and Japan in fields of
joint rrterest such as the exploitation of space for crvihan and mllitary purposes and other issues affectmg
secuntl,;
4. Task the Space Group to examine the possibilrty of enterurg rrto a dralogue wrth the Japanese
authontres rn'rth a vrew to future cooperatron rn areas such as Japan's plan to build a rrulrtary space-based
observation system and a data relay test satellite, and possible collaboration between the Torrejon Satellrte
Centre and Japan's Earth Observatron Centre, makmg sure that such cooperatron rs not confined to
exclusrvely strategic conc€rns but also covers rndustnal and technological issues.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr Valle*, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
l. ln 1973, the Technological and Aerospace
Commrttee pard rts first vrsrt to Japan and produced
a report on "Advanced Tcchnologf in Japan and the
consequenc€s for Europe" (Assembly Document
617, Rapporteur Mr Van Lent). Wrth reference to
space developments rn Japan, and more specrfically
to mtematronal cooperatron the report stated:
"Collaboratron wrth uestern Europe started
wrth a note m December 1972 on
cooperation betu'een the Science and
Technologv Agency and the European Space
Research Orgarusation
Accordrng to ttus note the agency'and ESRO.
(a) will periodically cxchangc screntrfic and
techrucal informatron published by them
urthout restnctron as to use;
(b) wrll endeavour to exchange urformation
on spac€ prograrnmes and prolectsof
mutual lnterest wrth the arn of studyng
their poss ible coordrnation;
@ agrc'e m pnnciple to arrange the
exchange of visits of specialists aimrng
at mutual famrliansatron wrth scientrfic
nork m progress;
(d) agree to hold mecturgs of therr officrals
as required in order to discuss gencral
matters of interest to the partles,
particularly' general policy' problems
and other such problems as concem the
fields rvhere closer cooperation of the
partles s desired "
2 One of thc conclusions drawn rn the report
was that rt rvould be drfficult for Europe to take
such actron untrl the European Space Agencl'had
been set up (r,luch rvas scheduled for Apnl 1974)
It added that Europe and Japan had parallel rnterests
rn manv space sectors. Both lnshed to gam an
rrdependent capabihq' ur launchers and telecom-
murucation satellrtes, to be followed subsequently
b1, remote-sensrng satellites concentrating on earth
resources, naugatron and mantune safety Finally,
the report noted that both the European and
Japanese space industnes \!€re workmg urth the
Uruted States on a bilateral basrs and that thrs
cooperatlon might rnell become tnpartrte, a prospect
rvhich \\'as consrdered both reasornble and
desrrable.
3 Thus one of the recommendations of the
report addressed to the WEU Councrl was to
"lrurte member countnes to estabhsh wlthrn
the framervork of the OECD, a special
commrttee of the Muristers responsrble for
technologl' and urdustry and of the perman-
ent representatives in order
(a) To concert their vreus on:
the transformation into trilateral collab-
oration of the bilateral space collab-
oratron betrveen Japan and the Unrted
States and Europe and the United States
covering all fields of space research,
development and space apphcatrons ..."
4 Later, ur 1983, the Commrttee again visited
Japan and the same y'ear produced a report entrtled
"Assessment of Advanced Technology in Japan"
(Assembly Document 956, Rapporteur Lord
Northfield)
5. A chapter of the report u'as dedrcated to the
then current Japanese space programme and future
projects. Intemational cooperatlon, rt porntcd out,
u'as maurly with the United States As far as
Europe was conc,emd annual consultations rvere
held rvith the European Spacc Agency' and there
lvere exchanges of urformatlon on matters such as
telecommurucation and remote-sensing satellrtes.
6. In Lord Northfield's vrew, the reason for the
lack of real cooperatron up to that time uith ESA
and wrth urdrvrdual European countries had been
inequalrty' of technological know-horv. Never-
theless, the rcport statcd, Japan felt it had caught up
and there was a desire on both sides for genurne
cooperation.
7. At the trme, papers on mutual use of
scientific and commurucation satellites, on Spacelab
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and on electroruc equipment uere bemg drscussed.
Japan aiso reached agreement lnth NASA and ESA
on wave frequencres. a 1986 launch by Japan of a
manne observailon satellrte and use of trackrng
stations rn Guiana and Austraha, and llith France
on the trackrng of the Spot satellrte. to be launched
ur 1985. Lastly, the report noted that the lau'
creatrng the Natronal Space Dcvelopment Agency
of Japan (NASDA) exphcrtly prohrbited any
nulitarl' activity bv the latter under the Japanesc
space prograrnme, a factor to u'tuch the
Commrttee's attention rvas spccifically' drawn
8 Frnally', among the recommendattons
contaured rn the report by Lord Northfield are tr,ro
wrth a beanng on the present report These call
upon the Courcil to
"Instruct thc Standing Armaments Com-
rmttee to studl'Japanese progress rn mrlitary
lugh technology, or technology' r,rfuch ma1'
have milrtary applications, together urth rts
prospects and submrt the conclusrons of ths
study to the Assembly;
In order to develop practrcal collaboration rn
space, and takrrg account of the fact that
Japan has just appourted a permanent
representative to Pans for space matters.
proposc the nomrnation of a parrnanent
representative of ESA to Japan to enable
ESA to consult continuouslv on collaborattve
projects."
9. In response to the first of thcse
recommendations, in September 1985 thc Standing
Armaments Commrttee published a report entrtled
"Outlook for future developments ur the Japanese
armaments urdustry and its possrble repercussrons
on Europel".
10. Referring to Japan's space capabiltty,
Chapter V of that report noted that although
Japanese space policy' admitted only to exclusively
civil ambitions, lt was clear that no hard and fast
drstrnctron u'as made between cMl and mrlitar)'usc
ofspace and that a launcher or observation satellitc
could have efher a cnrlian or military purpose,
dependrng on the payload carried by the launcher or
what the satellite was supposcd to observe.
11. The report's authors (thc Intemational
Secretanat of the Standurg Armaments Commrttec)
concluded rn ttus connectron that the latest computcr
technologl'(such as Japan had at the trme) made rt
possrble for a country to make use of tmages from
civrl observation satellrtcs for mrlrtarv observation
purposes.
12 Thc report also notes that the then Japanese
Pnme Mrmster. Mr Nakasone, held public dcbates
at the Diet on rvhether it rlas time for Japan to havc
a mrlitarl satellitc. Indeed rn early Januan' 1985.
the Head of Govemment stated before the Diet that
Japan should have its ow'n "sp1'" satcllites. rf therr
use became more rridcspread Tlus statcmcnt drd
not lead to a major pubhc outcry and the centre
(Komerto) and left-of-centre (Socral Democrat)
oppositron parties refrarned from an1' cnticism.
13. ln February 1985, the Prime Ministcr agarn
acknorvledged publicly to the Dict that tus country'
rvould use thc Amencan naval satcllite, Fleetsat, to
receive and send mrlrtary data ur the course oflourt
mrlrtary exercises uith thc Uruted States and ur
emergencies.
14. It should be bome in mind that rrr 1985,
President Reagan had already launched lus Strategic
Defence IruIatrve and that alhes of the US were
already givrng thought to ther possible
particrpatron. Mr Nakasone had declared himself in
svrnpathv with the US project.
15. Nevertheless the report noted the verl' great
difficulties there rverc for Japan in engagrng ur the
mrlrtansation of space Probabll' the brggest
obstacle was the deeply-entrenched pacifism of the
Japanese public, x'luch rvould be further reu:rforced
by the increase rn budget spendrng that any
commrtnent by Japan to join the nulitary space race
would imply.
16. The report also reiterated the argument of an
influentral seruor ciul servant rn the Japanese
Mmstry of Foreigrr Affairs, to the effect that w'lule
the Strategrc Defence Irutrative atmed to stop cnemy
nuclear deuces ln flight. it lvas nonetheless assumed
that some of those mrssrles u'ould pass through the
nerv defcnce system, and that the nuclear po\\'ers
would therefore be tempted to increase their arsenal
of offensive nuclear wcapons ur order to penetrate
enemy defences. Bv taking part in a space defence
sl,stem Japan would, paradoxcally', be contnbuting
to the build-up of nuclcar arms.1. Document SI (85) D/19
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17 Notwrthstandrng such rntuitive reactions and
reasoned arguments, Japan patently drd not u,ant to
remarn penpheral to the screntific and techrucal
progress such prolects and the research associated
wrth them would bnng.
18. The report concluded that Japan rvould ver1,
soon become a space po\4'er rn the cir,rl sector,
although rt regarded that countrl'. at that point in
trme, as laggurg behind the United States and
Europe. On the nulitarl'side, Japan would rrr future
openly undertake the militarl, observation missrons
it u'as, even then, engaged rr covertly.
19. As urll become apparent later, the debate on
mihtary observation satellites is still an issue rr
Japanese political life and the time u'hen politicians
urll have to make a decnron is draurng closer.
20. The above account arms to give a bnef
overvierv of the present Committee's work on the
Japanese space rndustrl'. In the chapters rvtuch
follow, your Rapporteur wrll endeavour to present
an assessment of space cooperation between Japan
and Europe and how this nught develop in the
future, partlcularl)' rr the nulitary space sector, the
area of specral urterest to the Commrttee.
21. The Commrttee's recent rasrt to Japan, rr July
1996, and the preparation ofthe present report serve
to demonstrate members' interest in ttls area and
their desire that Japan should be part of the
prospects for nulitarl' space development that are
opemng up to WEU. We must be aware,
nonetheless, of the drfficulties involved rn such an
undertaking grven the unusual features such issues
present ur a countrl' such as Japan, whrch has its
owrr lughly charactcnstic approach, but whrch
luthout doubt also has a number of mterests in
corrrmon wrth our orm
II. Some preliminary considerstions
on Japan's defence policy
22 Your Rapporteur feels that a bnef drscusslon
of the pohtical and constitutional lrnitations wrthrn
whrch Japan must u'ork rr relation to defence and
the armed forces is in order, to enable us to
understand the, at trmes, ambiguous way such sub-
jects are dealt urth ur Japan
23. Chapter II Article 9 of the Japanese
Constrtution, u'tuch was rmposed on the country by
the United States and enacted on 3 November 1946,
states.
"fuprnng smcerely to an lntemational peace based
on justice and order, the Japanese people forever
renounce \\'ar as a soverelgn right of the nation and
the threat or use of force as means of setthng
intemational drsputes.
In order to accomphsh the arm of the preceding
paragraph, land, sea and alr forces, as lrell as other
war potential, wrll never be maintaured The nght
of belhgerency of the state wll not be recognised."
24. Shortly aftenvards, the Korean War and the
start of the cold war led uritially, rn 1950. to the
formatron of a National Police Reserve, wtuch ur
1952 became the Natronal Secunty Force and then
rn 1954 the National Self-Defence Forces. Thrs
development rvas to lead to the statement some
\/ears ago by the Chairman of the Japanese Socrahst
Party that selfdefence forces uere legal, if uncon-
stitutional Japan's Supreme Court ruled that such
forces were in fact legal.
25. Yet another factor of crucial rmportance
uere the Japan-US Secuntl,Arrangements. On 8
September 1951, a peace treaty u'as signed in San
Francrsco between Japan, the Uruted States and the
olher porvers that had fought Japan except the
Sonet Union, the People's Repubhc of Chrna, and
Indra, wfuch refused to accede.
26. Several months later, m Apnl 1952, at the
same trme as the treaty came mto force, the first of
the Japan-US Security Arrangements \\,as
rmplemented, rvherebl' the Uruted States gave an
undertakrng to protect Japanese temtorl, and u'as
authonsed to station its troops there.
27. Shortl1, aftenvards. rn October 1953,
unmedrately after the end of the Korean u'ar. the
Japanese Muuster for Foreigrr Affarrs and hrs
Amencan counterpart made a lomt declaration
advocaturg a progrcssrve increase in Japan's defence
capabiliq,. In 1954 an agreement to pronde mutual
asslstanc€ rn defence matters was sigrred betrveen
the two countries
28 Accordrng to Darucl Coulml''s excellent
studv of "k Japon et sa defense'", t*'o opposurg
political trends held sway rn Japan at the trme, urth
the conservatives ur favour of maintaining relations
uith the Uruted States on a basis of equalitl' and
2. Le Japon et sa ddfense, Daniel Coulml', FEDN,
Paris l99l
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mutual respect, and the progresslves wanting Japan
not to take sides rn US-Souet confrontation.
Moreover the conservatives wanted to see
constitutional reform, especially ln relatron to
defence, rlfule the progressives were opposed to
such reform
29 As the conservatives could not muster the
necessary two-tturds maJont)' rn parliament, thel'
changed their tactics and argued that srnce Japan's
sovcreign[-had been restored, the country needed a
mrlrtary structure, the sole aim of lvtuch would be to
defend Japan's national temtory 
- 
an argument, in
their vrew, in keeprng wrth the letter of Article 9 of
the Constitutron and which led, as stated earlter, to
the formation, on I July 1954, of the National Self-
Defence Forces.
30. In the absence of a Ministry of Defence,
these forces came under the authonq'of the Defence
Agency, headcd by a cilrlian DrectorCeneral wrth
the rank of Muuster of State The Defence Agency
u'as drrectly answerable to the Pnme Muuster.
31. In July 1956. Daniel Coulmy3 writes,
Council of Defence was set up, under
chairmanshp of the Prime Minister, comprisurg the
Mruster for Foreigrr Affarrs, the Frnnce Murister,
the Drrector4eneral of the Defence Agency and the
Drector of the Agency for Economc Planning. In
1957 the Defence Council laid down the pnncrples
of national defence wluch rvould form the basis for
the govemment's defence pohcy
32. Two of them were to form the comerstone of
that policv The first held that the armed forces
rvould be used only for stnctly defensive misstons,
limited to protectron of the national territory. The
second provided that response to extemal
aggression could take place only uithtn the
frameu,ork laid doun rn the Japan-US secunt_y
treaty.
33. The Japanese Defence wlute paper,
publrshed n 1994 by the Defence Agency, states
that the Japan-US Secunt-v Arrangements are vrtal
to Japan's exstence and prosperity and that the era
of peace Japan has knoun srnce the second rvorld
rvar is due ur large measure to Japanese defence
efforts and the smooth application of those
arrangements The ufute paper furthermore states
that these should remam the basis of Japanese
the
the
3 op. cit
national pohcy as thel'play a vrtal part in Japan's
secunty, contnbuting to peace and security' rr the
Far East and formurg the core of Japan's
relationshrp nith the Uruted States and the basis for
Japanese drplomacy.
34. Funlly, it should be noted that these
arrangements not only cover cooperatton on defence
but also on political and economrc matters Tlus
means that the United States is Japan's sole source
of defence procurement abroad and also that
mrlrtary cooperation is possible only with the US.
35. Accordrng to data provided by the Japan
Defence Agency, ur 1993 69'/" of the Japanese
population regarded exsting milrtary structures, in
other rvords the arrangements wrth the United States
plus the National Self-Defence Forces, as the best
means of defcndurg the country 4%o were of the
vielv that the secunt-v arrangements should be
abolished and the selfdefence forces increasen, T%
that the security arrangements should be abolished
and the selfdefence forces reduced and20o/o gave a
drfferent answer or drd not reply. In 1978 the
respectrve perc€ntages were 6lo/o, 8oh, 5%o and
26%
36 Regardrng Japan's participatron ur United
Natrons peacekeeping operattons, ut 1993 responses
were as follou's: 48%o approved or partly approved,
3l% drsapproved or partly disapproved, wtule 21o%
ansrvered "depends or dont know". The figures for
I 990 were 460/0, 38o and l7%o respecttvely.
37. Jean-Marie Bouissoua constders that the
malority view, both among conservatrve politicians
and wrthrn the Social Democratic Part)', favours
strurgthemng Japan's capabrlrty to act rn the
rnternatronal sphere, rrulitanll'as m other respects,
despite a hostile response to tlus aspiration both
from public oprruon ur Japan and from neighbouring
countries. Attempts are being made to deflect tlus
hostility' b1' puttrng foru'ard two arguments.
- 
the need for thc Uruted States to continue
to play an actrve role in any' rrtemational
effort to marrtam order rn Asra, even if it
means Japan pay,rng more towards the
cost ofa US presence, and
4 Japon, Probldmatiques et perspectlves des
evolutions politiques. Bulletin du Centre d'analyse
et de prevision, No. 66, Spring 1996 Ministry of
Forergn Affairs. Paris.
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- 
the need for any pro.lection of Japanese
forces outside the countrl,to be stnctll'
u,rthrn a United Nations' frameu'ork,
under mtematronal command
38 Your Rapporteur urll return later to some of
the aspects of Japanese defence policy bricfl1'
outlured rn the present chapter.
III. Japan's space policy
39 The Space Actrr,rtres Commrssion (SAC)
attached to the Pnme Mmrster's Office (see Table l)
u-as estabhshed ur 1968 urth the arm of bmging
together the space actrrltres of the various
govemment agencies and promotrng Japan's space
development
40 In March 1978. the SAC dreu' up the
"Fundamental Pohcl' of Japan's Space Acti'r,rties",
settrng out the basrc prurcrples u'hrch are to guide
Japan's space activrties ur the longer term Tlus
pohcv has been relrsed on various occasions to take
account of polrtrcal. screnilfic and technological
developments at home and abroad.
41 ln lure wrth SAC thnkrng, Japan promotes
space development for pcaceful purposes based on
the follourng prurcrples
(a) Promotion of crcative scientrfic research
and technologl' development, thc arm
being to rncrease knoxledge about
space. leadrng to a deeper understandrng
of the ongrns, structures and evolution
of the uruverse and the solar svstem.
earth scrences, rr'hrch rnvestigate long-
term global environment changes and
other matters relaturg to the planet,
usmg space observation data. and
matenals and life sclenc€s that use
spacc as an environment, lncrcasmg
efforts to mamtam Japan's technological
expeftlse on a par wrth rntemational
levels
(b) Apphcatron of the results of space
development to other areas in socrelv
and promotron of space actr"rties rr
order to respond to the rncreasrngly
complex and vancd needs of society
(c) Specral efforts to reduce space transport
costs and increase the cost*ffectiveness
of satclhtes m order to wrn more public
support for space development
(d) Actrve promotron of intemational space
cooperatlon appropnate to Japan's
position m the world
@ Balanced development of manned and
urunanned space s1,stems. Manned
flight svstems are to be developed
urthm the framework of rntematronal
cooperation
(fl Development of the Japanese space
rndustrl', urcludrng space hardrvare and
component manufacturers
(9,) Protectron of the space envrronment,
avoidrng productron of more space
debns rvhen pursurrg fufure actrlrties rr
space.
42 The prion['areas for Japan's space develop-
ment are as follorvs
(a) Earth observafion and earth sqences
Thc SAC recogruses that earth observation
b1' satellrte wrll become urcreasrngll,
rmportant as a sourc€ of useful ffirmatron
to advance earth science and resolve global
environment problems To this end, Japan
rntends to proceed *rth the svstemailc and
ongorng development and use of earth
observatron satellites to meet socretlrs needs.
The process is to consist of developrng
observation sensors, restrucfunng exstrng
information netu'ork and strengthenmg the
intematronal structure so that urder use can
be made of observatronal data
A global earth observation svstem urll also
be established "through urtematronal
consultatron and coordrnatron". Its purpose
rmll be to achieve harmoruous integratron of
the observatlon satclhtes of the countnes
rnvolvcd ur the pro.yect.
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Table l
National organtsations mvolved in space acfivties
Ir_
I -*;,',-,'*'*u"- ],
Trade and Industry
-^r.n., 
orto** I
I S.,.n.. and Technology
Electrotcchncal Labtralory
N{rnstry of Posts md
Telecomuilcatlons
N mstry of
Hme Alfairs
] CommurucalrmsResearch
Labuatory (CRL) 
]
Telemmmurucahom Advancemenl
Orgarusatrm of Japm (TAO)
L
Geograplucal Survey Itrhtute ]
[.,"r*o**-_l
Space Actlvlt,es
Comssrm
Nahmal Pubhc
Safety Commrsston
] Narmal Spae Developmenl
Agency ofJapan (NASDA)
] I*t,tut" ofSpace and
AeromutrcaI Sciencc (ISAS)
lUecharucal Engrnemng
m
I
\leteorolo$cal Satellrle
Centre
'""::::f"',' I
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@ Promofion of space saence and lunar
explorafion
Japan rntends to promote astronomrcal
observation and scientific research on the
solar s1'stem, planets and asterords, and
undertake further exploration of the moon to
evaluate possrbilities for rts exploitation.
(c) Consohdanon of space ufilisafion
aCfiVfieS
Japan is to be rnvolved rn the Intcmatronal
Space Station through the Japanese
Expenment Module (JEM). also knowr as
the Orbrtal Laboratory. JEM wrll play a
central role in research activities both rn
space and on Earth A general research
s1'stem wrll be established in partrershrp w'rth
the JEM to consohdate space utihsation
actrlrtres
(d) Enhancement of genenc satellite
technologt and ufi h safi on
Japan not onlv rntends to continue to enhance
these technologies but wrll also develop
advanced satellite mrsslons and equipment
for telecommumcations, broadcasting and
nalrgatron.
(e) Development and operafion of new
space mfrastructure
Neu' space ffiastructure will be developed
to rmplement vrable space actilrties includrng
thc following projects.
- 
the advanced HJI launch velucle (H-IIA)
desrgrred both to respond flexrbly,to the
growmg demand for various satellite-
launch missions and to keep launch costs
doun.
- 
the HOPE-X desrgned to develop the
maur technologres for a reusablc transport
vetucle, lrfuch would drastically. reduce
transport costs;
- 
the Data Rela1, Test Satellite (DRTS)
s)'stem designed to ensure effective
transmissron of earth observation data
and data from expenments carried out rr
space.
43. SAC's uew regarding observation satellites,
which are of major interest to WEU and certarnly to
thrs Commrttee, rc that they should contnbute to a
better understanding of areas such as u'eather
forecastmg, chmate-change predrctron, morutonng
ocearuc phenomena, geology, the exploration of
earth resources, vegetailon, agnculture and oceamc
ecosvstems. and aid research urto other
enr.rronmental issues such as global warrrung or
ozone larer depletron or rnto natural disasters such
as earthquakes, volcanic eruption and the hke
SAC stresses the importance of expandrng activitics
ur tlus field.
44. Agarn accordrng to SAC, a number of earth
observatron satellites are to be developed and
operated svstematrcally to meet the needs of users at
home and abroad andto keep Japanese projects at a
level corffnensurate urth other countnes'
observatron and research prqects.
45 Tlus is to be done through NASDA (the
Natronal Space Dcvelopment Agencl) n collab-
oratlon urth universrtres, research rnstitutes,
goverffnent agencies and the private sector.
46 The vanous earth observatron satellites fall
rnto trvo tlpes atnosphenc and occaruc observatron
satellrtes and land observatron satelhtes.
47. Finally. SAC states that efforts u'ill be made,
through close cooperation between the development
and rmplementrrg agencl'and user organisations, to
enhance sensor precrsion and resolution and to
develop a new sensor.
48 As Table I shows, many agencies,
answerable to drfferent mrrustnes. are mvolved m
space actr.iatres However, it may be noted that the
Japan Defence Agency'has not been given any
responsibilrtv for space matters.
49 The Space and Technology Agency (STA),
u'hrch is drrectly answerable to the Pnme Minister's
Officc, plans, prograrnmes and promotes spac€
pohcl', generalll' coordinates space actl!.ltles among
govemmental agencles and conducts research and
development actintres through its subordinate
research urstitution, the National Aerospace
Laboratory (NAL), and NASDA.
50 NAL's pnncipal actrutres are research mto
basic technologies for spaceplanes rn the fields of
aerodlnamrcs, advanced composte structures, flrght
control and propulslon svstems, manned space
flrghts and orbiter numoeuwmg motors. It also
carries out jornt research urth NASDA on
l0
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aerdlnarrucs, guidance and control and the desigr
structure for the HJI Orbitrng Plane (HOPE) It is
also undertakrng research on orygcn-hydrogen
rockct engme components and on satellrte sy'stems
and space environment uillisatron.
5l NASDA rvas founded rn 1969 as the national
organisatron for the rmplementation of Japan's space
development programme and the promotion of
space actrlrtres for peaceful ends.
52. NASDA's marn tasks arc to dcvelop satellites
and launch vehrcles, to launch and track such
vetucles and to set up the procedures. facrlrtres and
orgarusational structures to that end, ur accordance
urth the spacc development prograrnme.
53 NASDA has put sevcral satellites mto orbrt
using the N-I, N-II and H-I launch vellcles.
NASDA's first satellite, the Engrreenng Test
Satellite I (ETS-D u'as launched b1'the N-l ur 1975.
The N-I rvas used to launch a further sx satellites
Thc N-II has launched eight satellites rn all srnce
198I and the H-I mne srrce 1986
54 Last but not least, NASDA has developed
the H-II launch vehiclc usrng technologl, that is
l00o% Japanese Its first flight. rn February 1994,
rvas hrghly successful.
55. Apart from launch mstallatrons such as the
Tanegashima Space Ccntre. the Yoshinobu Launch
Complex and other space centres such as that at
Tsukuba, and the Karuda Propulsron Centre.
NASDA also runs the Earth Observation Centre.
56. This centre rcceives and processes remote-
senslng data from Japan's Manne Observation
Satellrte (MOS-l/lb), Landsat (Uruted States), Spot
(France), the first European Remote-Sensrrg
Satellite (ERS-l) and Japan's Earth Resource
Satellite (JERS-l)
57 To date, no contact rvould seem to have been
established betueen the Earth Observation Centre
and WEU's Satellrte Centre at Torrelon
58 The Instrtute of Spacc and Astronautical
Science (ISAS) was founded rrr Apnl 1981 when a
rcorgamsation took place of the Institute of Space
and Aeronautical Science of the Uruversrty of
Tolq'o, wluch rrr 1970 had already launched Japan's
first satellite, Ohsumr. ISAS is a nafional research
mstltute attached to the Mrristry of Educatron and
run rn assocntion uith a number of Japancse
universities.
59. ISAS cames out screntific research usurg
space vehicles and to ttus end del'elops and operates
soundrng rockets, satellite launchers, scientific
satellites, planetary probes and screntrfic balloons.
By, Februar1, 1993,21 scientific and test spacecraft
had been launched. urcludrng Susei and Sakigake
rvhich explored Halley's Comet rn 1986
60 ISAS has vanous facrlitrcs, ulmong them the
Kagoshrma Space Centre, wluch ts used for rocket
launches and also has telemetn', trackrng and
guidance stations for rockets and satellitcs.
61. The Mrustry of Intcmational Tradc and
Industrl' promotes the rndustnal ufllsatron of space
w,rth specral focus on remote-sensurg and mrcro-
granlv Among other prqects, MITI is workmg on
the development of ERS-I observation sl,stems and
the Advanced Spaceborne Thermal Emrssron and
Reflectron radiometer (ASTER), wfuch is an
advanced multiband, lugh-resolution searchrng
sensor to be mounted on NASA's Earth Observatron
Sl,stem-A (EOS-AMD, and also on research and
development of technologl' and facilities for usrng
remote-sensmg data
62 As Table I earlier rn the present chapter
shorvs, other rnstitutions besides those mentioned
havc a space remit and undertake uork rn the field.
Table 2 shorvs the arurual budgct statistics for space
development for the 1995 and 1996 financral vears.
63. Frnally 1-our Rapporteur feels it important to
mention, albeit bnefly, two earth observatron
satellrte programmes, ADEOS and DRTS, ll'tuch
could be of spccral rnterest to the Committee
64. Follou'rng on from the MOS-l/lb and
JERS-I satellrtes, the ADEOS (Advanced Earth
Observation Satellite) programme aims princr-
pally to:
dcvelop advanced earth observation
SCNSOTS,
develop a modular satcllrte that is thc kev
tcchnologv of the future platform,
conduct expenments on earth observation
data relay usrng data-relay satellrtes to
form a global observation netuork, and
contnbute to national and rrternational
cooperation by, carrlmg sensors
developed by national and/or foreign
orgamsations in response to Announce-
ments of OppornrniS.
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Table 2
Budget for the I 995- I 996 fnanual year
Space development
Notes l. Amounts ur mrllions of 1,en
2 Furancral year: starts Apnl and ends March of the follourng 1,ear
Organisatron 1995 financial y'ear
Draft budget for 1996
financial year
Scrence and Technologv
Asencv (STA) t77 002 t78 29',7 r00'7 (%)
National Spacc
Development Agency'of
Japan (NASDA) t72 398 t72 999 100 3
National Aerospace
Laboratorl'NAL) 4 000 I 323 108. I
National Police Agencl,
(NAP) 676 6',7',7 100. I
Enraronment Agencl'
(EA) '761 820 107 8
Muustry of Education
(MOE) 2l 414 22 072 103 I
Mirustry of Intematronal
Trade and Industry
(Mrrr) t2 754 11 017 86.4
Ministrl'of
Transportatron (MOT) t2 328 t3'722 lll.3
Mrnistry of Posts and
Telecommumcatlons
(MPr) 2 033 2 999 l1'l 5
Mrrustn'of Construction l .187 I 566 105.3
Ministry of Home Affairs 37 62 t67 6
Total 228 508 231 245 101.2
t2
Source. Suence and Technologt Agency
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65. The programme urcludes the ADEOS-I and
II satellrtes. Launch ofthe first of these is scheduled
for 1996 and the second for 1999. both by the H-II
spacc velucle The satellites, u-tuch are to operate at
an altitude of 800 km, wrll weigh 3.5 and 3.6 tonnes
respectrvcll' The programme bnngs together var-
ious Japanese bodres and rnstrtutrons (NASDA,
MITI etc ) urth NASA and CNES
66 ADEOS-I will have a resolutton of 8 metres
usrng thc AVNIR (Advanced Visible and Near
Infrared Radrometer) sensor and 700 metres using
the OCTS (Ocean Colour and Temperature
Scanner) ADEOS-II wrll rncorporate nelv anten-
nas. ur particular, a nucrowave radiometer, and wrll
also make use of globalmagmg.
67. The data relal' test satellite, rvluch wrll store
data from other observatron satellitcs and transmrt it
to a ground station, uill prolrde 85olo coverage of
the Earth's surface. The DRTS-W is scheduled for
launch in 2000 and the DRTS-E rn 2001, both by'
the HJI space velucle. It should be noted that the
need for this tlpe of satellrte rvas referred to ur the
development studres for a European space-based
observatron system camed out by' the Studl'
Management Team. The lugh cost of such a
satellite ruled rt out, at least rn the first phase of the
prolect
68. Before bnngrng thrs chapter to a close. it ts
uorth notrng certarr unusual features of Japan's
space rndustrl'. On the w'hole, Japan has no
specialist aerospace urdustry but the major
rndustnal groups devote a part of their actiuty to
space, although it accounts for only' a fraction of
their turnover. Thc space sector rs thought to
provrde somc I I 000 1obs. The technological and
commercnl po\\'er of these firms would m any event
suggcst that they urll become formrdable
competitors m the near future. Indeed, they' are
already toglrly competitrve as regards the ground
segment as a whole.
69. There are two maJor aerospace federations,
the Japanese Federation of Economrc Orgarusations
(Keidanren), with its oun specnl Space Activities
Promotron Councrl, a"nd the Socielv of Japanese
Aerospace Companies (SJAC) whrch coordrnates
sales promotion czlmpalgns.
70. The Science and Technology Agency,
NASDA and MITI have lorned forces uith pnvate
rndustrl' to form a number of consortia and mrxed
public/private comparues, urth the arm of rmproung
development condittons and competrtlveness
71. Japan's priman'industrial group urth space
rnterests is Mitsubishr. Tlus ncludes Melco
(Mrtsubrstu Electroruc Corporation). rvhose
Kamakura mstallatrons the Commrttcc vrsitcd
dunng its reccnt tnp to Japan. Melco burlds tele-
commrmrcatron satcllrtes 
- 
it burlt the ISS and ERS
earth observation satellites 
- 
and telecom-
murucation satellrte receivrng stations. lt also forms
part of thc consortium created to dcvelop the
Engureenng Test Satellites ETS-V and VI and was
responsible for the CS-2 and CS-3 and lntelsat-5
and 6 commurucation satellites, m conjunction urth
the Amencan Ford Companl'
72. Mitsubishr Heary Industnes Ltd. was
involved in burldrng the N-I, N-II and H-I and H-II
launch velucles. Thc N-I launchers rvere developed
under hcence from McDonnell-Douglas It rs also
burlding the H-II launcher's two crlogeruc stages
and the combustion chambers.
73. Mitsubrstu Precision Co. Ltd. manufactures
attitude control and gurdance sy'stems and also
develops control sl,stems while Mitsubrslu Spacc
Softrvare Co Ltd is rnvolvcd m softrvare
development.
74. Thc Nssan Motor Co. Ltd produces
soundrng rockets. It dcvcloped ISAS's M-V launch
vehrcle and the boosters for the H-I launcher.
75 Tostuba produces direct broadcastrng
satellites and is thc prune contractor and
manufacturer of the BS-2 broadcastrng satellitc, rn
association rvith GE-RCA. In addrtron. it partici-
pated, as part of a consortium wrth Melco and
NEC, rn the burldrng of ETS-V and M
76. The NEC Corporation. rvhose Tsukuba
research centre the Commrttce also nsited recentll'.
builds scientrfic satellites NEC built the GMS
(Geostatronary Meteorologrcal Satcllite) and MOS
(Manne Observation Satellrte) and was a member
of the manufactunng consortium uith Melco rvhrch
burlt ETS-V and VI. It produced the BS-3 rn
coryunction u.rth the Amcncan firm GE-RCA and
has built telecommurucatron satellrte recet\lng
stations.
77 Kan'asala Hear.y Industnes Ltd builds the
launch pads for the N and H launch velucles and the
fairurg for the H-IL Fujitsu Ltd manufactures
small ground stations and remote-scnsing
radiometers, tclemetrv sy'stems. microrvavc
ampl ifi crs and data-proccssing svstems.
13
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78 Fnally (although the hst camot be said to be
exhaustrve). Flltachi Ltd manufactured the data-
processmg s)'stem for the ASTRO-C and EXOS-D
satellites Ishrkauajima-Hanma Heavy lndustnes
Co Ltd burlds rocket engrnes and the Japan
Ar.ration Electrorucs Industry Ltd makes optrcal
fibrcs and electroruc aerospace equipment.
IV Civil space cooperation
between Europe and Japan 
-future prospects
79. The European Busmess Community' (EBC)
m Japan rs a pnvate orgarusation representmg
European comparues and rches on support from
them, from thc national Chambers of Commerce m
Japan and from the European Commrssion. Its
arms are to promote closer cooperation and
coordinatron bctrveen the rntional Chambers of
Commercp. rmprove and formalise informatron
netrvorkrng and act as spokesman for the European
business corffnumtv ns-d-us the Japanese
authonties rn all areas relevant to the rrdustrial and
commercnl sectors
80. The EBC rvorks tlrough commrttees, one
berng the Aeronautrcs and Space Commrttee, wluch
rtself has a Space Subcommrttcc. charred by Mr
Claudon, head of the Ananespace Toky'o office
The Subcommrttee was exlremelv helpful ln
orgarusmg the Commrttee's recent lrsit to Japan and
assisturg urth the prcsent report The bureau of the
Technologrcal and Aerospace Committee and y'our
Rapporteur had the opporturut)' to meet the
Subcommrttee and drscuss rn depth many of the
aspects of greatest mterest to our aims.
81 The EBC has lust pubhshed a wtute paper
for 1996. Tlus porrts out that Japan is a rvorld
leader rn the space sector, uith a budget around half
that of Europe's space budget The rec€nt
successful launch of the H-II rocket gives Japan the
rndependent access to space rt has been seekrng. In
the satellite sector Japan is buildmg and launchrng
approxrmatell' one satellite per year.
82. Holvever the uealgress of Japan's space
utdustry hes rr rts underdeveloped commercial
sector u'here manufacturers rely almost exclusively
on the domestic market, ur other lrords on orders
from NASDA or ISAS. fu a result, Japanese
satellrte manufacturers are for example unable to
compete on the r.lorld satellrte market due to ther
lorv volume of busuress. They therefore concentrate
on component manufacture 
- 
payloads, solar
panels, ground stations and the hke.
83 The w,lute paper also notes that there is as vet
no cooperation on space lvorth menlomng between
European and Japanese comparues, and the onl1,
notable European success from a commercral pornt
of vreu' has been the sale of launch services by
Ananespace to Japanese satellite operators
84 The EBC rdentifies a senes of key factors,
pomtmg first to the fact that NASDA has untrl
recentlv follorvcd a poho, of Japanese technologrcal
urdependence urth lrttle regard to cost. u'tuch meant
that vrrtuallv all forergn cooperation rvas ruled out.
Nevertheless. doubtlcss o\\mg to pressure on
budgets, there is norv greater emphasrs on cost and
foreign purchascs are beurg authonsed or even
recommended.
85 Moreover, Japanese comparues still have
very little autonomy, particularly' m research and
devclopment u'here govcmment contracts are split
betu'een many drfferent comparues, makrng
cooperation rirth foreign comparues drfficult, rf not
unpossible Accordrng to the EBC this poho,
prevcnts Japanese rndustrv from compctrrg and
therefore excludes rt from world markets, to the
detnmcnt of all the parties.
86. Govemment agencies are strll verl'much rr
control of manufacturers m the space sector, which
makes drscussron at rndustry level and the
unplemcntation of long-terrn cooperation strategies
very drfficult Lastlr', there is very lrttle cooperauon
betrveen NASDA and the European Space Agencl'
(ESA)
87. Accordrng to ESA5. cooperation betu'een the
Agency and Japan began ur 1972 urth an exchange
of letters provrding for armual brlateral meetrrgs and
limited exchanges of personnel In 1988 a tentative
move began towards more substantial cooperatron.
The scope for cooperation is graduall1, emergrrg
and covers the exchange of scientrfic and earth
observation data, jornt expenments for the
validation of future data-relay' satellites,
demonstrations for robotics, product assurance
contracts and support for tracking statrons
88. While ESA acknowledges that progress has
been achieved over the years, it feels that relations
with Japan are luruted rn content. It nevertheless
sees promising prospects operung up for future
cooperatlon over the space statron, where Japan and
Europe are makrng verr, srmilar contributrons, and
t4
s ESA/rRC (94) 45.
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ur other fields such as earth observation. ESA
considers that rn the longer term there could be
fruitful collaboration in areas such as manned and
automatrc space transport svstems, and lunar
exploratron
89. Some ESA member states, such as France,
Germany and Srveden, are cooperalrng urth Japan
on earth observatton. mrcrograr.T [' expenments and
satellite trackrng
90. Areas that are competittve are subject to
political pressure from the Uruted Statcs rn trade
negotiatrons, with the result that none of the
European satellite manufacturers has been awarded
a contract wrth Japan surce the rntemational market
for commercial and operattonal satellite
procurement uas. theoretically, opened up in 1990
All such contracts have gone to American firms.
91. ESA concludes that future relailons between
Europe and Japan ur the field of cil,I space
actrvities will be influenced b1'three factors:
(t) The combrnatron of Japan's R&D plan,
covenng all applicatrons and spac.e
transport and advanced technologies,
with a steadrll,nsrrg space budget wrll
strcngthen Japan's posttton on the
urtematronal stage. Moreover there is a
high level of rrstitutional consensus in
Japanese societl' and Japan's space
industry has alreadl' consolidated its
leadrng-edge positron rn ground segment
equrpment and is n the process of
acquinng the full rangc of up-todate
knorv-how;
(,r) Japan's relattve autonomy rr specific
sectors of space actrlrt-v such as
transporLatron and satellite technologtr'
may well prompt t to reconstder tts
dependence on the Uruted States and
look for more balanced alliances
allowrng it to play a more active role on
the internatronal stage;
(in) The Japanese market for satellite
systems, hardrvare and industnal
components is growrng. Although
Japanese supphers have acquired new
competenc€, the country must look to
complementary European and Amen-
can expertise for tts post-2000
programmes.
92. In conclusron, ESA reckons that. as a result
of its stable development and busuress grouth,
Japan could emerge as a reliable partner for Europe
and offer it a potential markct. But Europe must
formulate a space stratcg-v that addresses the
potentrahiles of cmperatron ufule facilitatrng the
entry of European rndustry to the Japanese market.
Such a strateg-v should take urto consrderation all
the relevant Japancse bodres and promote the
burldrng of closer political and technologrcal
relatrons urth them at the appropnate level ESA
and the Commrssion of the European Uruon should
take such action as rs appropnate.
93. A report b1' the European Commtsston's DG
XII6 makes thc pornt that lvlule therc are clearlv
opporturutres for further cooperatlon betrveen
Europe and Japan. it has to be recogrused that Japan
has built up rts oun expertise m space through
twenlv 1'ears of cooperatton uith the Umted States
in the pubhc and private sectors Its natural rrstlrct
is thus to look to that @untr)' first rvhen it comes to
possrbllitres for cooperation and tlus apphes at
govemment and, even more so, at rrdustrial levcl.
94. Japan regards Europe's space expertlse as a
largely unknoun or untested area. Moreover, it sees
m the cancellation of the Hermes programme and
the lunitations on Columbus signs of uncertarnS'
over ESA's long-term programme.
95. The report polnts to the need for Europe to
ensure that its experttsc on space has a tugher
profile in Japan, smce the latter prefers to develop
cooperation on the basis of a long-term relatronslup.
The first step would be for ESA to estabhsh an
office ur To\,o, surce the absence of one ts
rrterpreted b1' the Japanese as a lack of interest rt
fosterurg cooperation x'rth Japan The ESA office
should rvork closely u'rth the To\'o Delegatron of
the European Commrssion and urth the European
Busmess Communitv. The report makes the pornt
that the Japanese find it difficult to understand hor,r'
the Europeans conduct thcir u'ork ur relatron to
space and rvould prefer to have a smgle rnterlocutor.
As thrs rs rmpossrble to aclueve, it u'ould at least be
desirable for European representattves rn Japan to
work ur close contact to present a common front,
and, rn an), event, to avotd contradrctions.
96 Another verl' rmportant consideratton is to
enter mto discusstons on cooperation at an early
6. Japan in Space: Challenges and possible
opportunities for Europe. BIS Strategrc Decistons,
Pans and EUPAC, November 199-1.
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stage, ufule it is strll possible to influence concepts.
Japan rs not partrcularh'rnterested rn takrng part ln
a project once it has already' been defined,
prefemng. as suggested earlier, to bccome rrvolved
m longer-term prolects or research.
97 The EBC's Spacc Subcommrttcc also feels
*nt a fuller. ongomg dralogue betw'een Europe and
Japan should be cstablishcd as soon as possrblc and
that ESA must open a Tokvo officc ruth the
backmg of the European Uruon. at the same trme,
the space agencies of the leadrng members of ESA
should strengthen brlateral relations wrth Japan
98. The Subcommrttee stresses some of the
factors that should help to foster cooperation such
as: the fact that Japan's technologl' rs on a par urth
Europe's, therr budgets are of the same order, there
are manv srmrlanties rn ther space policies (for
example spacc devclopment for pcaccful purposes),
u'tuch is not nccessanly true of the Uruted States.
and thel'havc manv corrrmon urterests
99 Lastly, the EBC's u,hrte paper. to u'hrch
reference has been made throughout tlus chapter,
sets out a senes of rccommendations we find verv
mtcrestmg.
100 It recommends first that the Japanese
agenclcs should allou' Japanese manufacturcrs more
flexrbilrry' and rndependence. Even in negotiations
and cooperatrve ventures between European and
Japanese comparues. Japanese govemment agencies
have an ovemeening urflucnce m corrrmcrclal deci-
sions or over the detarl of cooperation arrangements.
l0l Cooperatron at mdustry level should be
encouraged so as to bc cffectrve. Japanese agencres
should unreservedly accept European standards
102 Frrally, the EBC strcsses that srgruficant
cooperatron urll be possrblc onlv if promoted by the
respectire European and Japanese govemment
agencies m such fields as launchers, space stations,
remote sensmg, nangation and global rrformation
systems.
V Feasibility of military space cooperation
between Europe and Japan
103. Chapter II of the present report outhned
certaur characteristics govemrng Japan's defence
pohcy Constrtutionalll,, Japan's defence budget
accounts "only'" for about l% of GNP, although the
actual figure is lugher than the amount countries
such as France, Germany or the Unitcd Krngdom
allocate to their defence (as shoun ur Table 3)
Table 3
Outh ne of de-fe nc e - re la ted expendt ture
Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest ufiole, therefore totals may not tally
Source. Defence ofJapan, 1991, Defence Agency
Classihcation 1994 financial year (yen) 1993 financial t'ear (yen)
Defence-related expendrture -1683 5 billion 4 6-10 6 billion
Grorrth over pre\rous )'ear
Percentage of GNP
Pcrcentage of general account
budget
0.9 Yo
0 918 Yo
6.4 Yo
t.950h
o 9370
6.1yo
Contract authonsation and ongorrg
expenses (nerv) I 853.1 brlhon I 801.1 billion
Fufure commrtnents 2 889.7 billion 2 847 | billion
(neu) (l 830.1 billion) (r 772 0 billion)
(already' commrtted) (l 059 7 billion) (l 075 0 billion)
l6
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104. Japan has built up a defence urdustry rvtuch
is able to meet most of its needs The rndustry has
operated maurly under licence and through
technology transfer but, increasrrgly, Japan is
mo\,mg towards developrng urdependent
capabilities.
105. Accordrng to the EBC, the present situatron
prevents the Defence Agcncy and firms within the
defence urdustry provrdurg rnformation on equlp-
ment specificatrons to the outside world other than
the Uruted States This means that European
companies are only' able to sell non-lT tal equipment
and onlf if thcre are no competing Japanese or
Amencan supphers. Cooperation wrth Europe is
not on the agenda.
106. The EBC is askrng for the regulations on
technology transfer, as these apply' to European
companies, to bc relaxed to bring them rnto line wrth
those for US comparues so tlut the former can also
take part in public tenders and rndustnal
cooperation. The EBC also notes that, gtvcn the
unassarlable strength of the Uruted States defence
industnes, there are only a very fcrv cases uhere
European industry'can compete, and pleads that in
these at least, suppliers should be chosen on ment
and not on the basis ofpolitrcal constderations.
107 Notwrthstandrng the above. it has to be sard
that changes are begurmng to make themselves felt.
Norv that the cold \ ar ls over, nations are clearly
seeking to achieve a ne\\' u'orld order based on
today's realities Japan is part of that movement
and, rn vanous politrcal. mrlrtary, academrc and
local commurulv forums, rs beginmng to rethink rts
security and defence arrangements as a key issue of
national policy
108 In short, a process of drscussion has begun
u,rthin Japan, the aim of rvluch is to revierv the
present national defence conc€pt and generate rdeas
that may provide the basis for an altemative.
109. Among the vanous forums for discussion,
the Advisory Group on Defence Issues s one that
deserves particular mention. Created in early 1994
as a non-statutory adnsory group to the Prime
Miruster, it compnses seruor representatives from
rndustrl', rnsurance, bankrng and the academic
world. The outcome of its discussions is made
public and many' of rts conclusions are worthy of
particular attentton.
110. Frrst, the Group feels that the network of
alliances formed during the cold rvar penod, at the
heart of which lies the United States. should be
preserved. Reference is made both to the Japan-US
Secunt_v Arrangements and to NATO
I I 1. However, the Uruted Statcs no longer
domrnates the rest of the world, particularly' rn the
econonuc field, w'here competition behveen it and
other highly developed urdustnal countnes continues
to grow sharper The Group feels that despite
present conflrcts of economic mterests, and any that
ma)' anse rn future, the focus of secunty and
defence cooperatlon should conttnue to be the
Uruted States
ll2. The qucstron, as far as the Adrrsory Group
is concerned, rs lvhether the Uruted States wrll be
able to show leaderslup rr multilateral cooperatlon.
The arswer will depend m part on other nations'
positrons wrth regard to cooperation urth the Uruted
States. Arrangements for resohrng secuntv
problems through intematronal cooperatton are not
yet perfect. but the signs of progress are obuous,
both at United Natrons and regional levels
113 The point is also made that whether or not
the Uruted Natrons is able to continue rts
peacekeeprng operations rn future will depend to a
large extent not only on contlnuing cooperation
betlveen the five members of the Secunty Council
but also between ma.;or nations, such as Japan and
Germany, u'luch make a very substantial financial
contnbution to peacekeeping efforts
I 14 One carurot lav enough stress on the verl'
great weight Japan attaches to u'hat it calls is
rntcmational contnbution, and particularly' to UN
peacekeeprng operations. The renex'. Defence of
Japan, 1994, to wtuch the present report makes
refcrence throughout, states :
"It is this country's intemational obligatron to
make such contributions in intemational
sociery', and such efforts contnbute to the
mamtenance of peace and secuntv of
intemational society and are eventually
conducive to Japan's oun security."
115. Retuming to the conclusions of the AdrTsory
Group to the Japancse Pnme Murister, the Group
maintarrs that the dangers facurg the world today
are vaned and drfficult to predict and must be
tackled through cooperatton between the United
States and other larger nations. under a mandate
from the United Nations, and uith the assistance of
othcr regional orgarusations.
17
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I16. Houever it goes on to say that under present
circumstances, countnes should have therr ox,n
defence capabrlrty and. that berng so, Japan should
divest rtself of the passlve secuntv pohcv rt has
followed rurtil norv and hencefonrard play an aclve
part rr desrgmng the nerv order 
- 
rndeed rt has a
responsrbrlrtl' to do so.
ll7 . If Japan is to assume that responsrbrlrty, rt
will need to make the effort it requires by bnngrng
all avarlable poho', drplomatic, financral and
defence-related means to bear, in order to build a
ratronal and comprehensrve securitl' policy wluch
the Adusory Group defines as:
(a) promotmg multrlateral secunt)'
cooperation on a global and regional
scale:
(b) enhancrrg the functronrng of the Japan-
US secunq' relatronshrp; and
(c) possesslng a lugtrtl'rehable and efficrent
defence capabilitl' based on strength-
ened rnformatron and prompt cnsls-
management capabilitres
I l8 ln connectron urth tlus laS pomt, the Group
hghlghts the rmportance of rntelligence s1'stems to
lmprove nsk-assessment capabilities; for tlus, rvell-
orgamsed C3I s1'stems urll be necessary, as uell as
vanous hpes of scnsors, urcludrng reconnaissancc
satellrtes
I 19 On 5 Ma1' 1996, the Japanese press reported
that the Japan Defence Agcncy envrsaged burldrng
an rndependent data-gathering facrh6, through the
launch of a military rcconrnissance satellrte ur the
medrum term
120. Both the Nrhon Kerzar Shrmbun and the
Mkku Shimbun of that date camed reports that the
Defence Agencl'wanted to procure an rndependcnt
reconnalssance satellite to enhance rts capabrh6' for
gatherurg urtelhgence on the milrtary srtuatron m
neighboururg countnes. The Agency has until nolr'
rehcd on data of Amencan ongrr to meet lts
requucments for tughdefimtron satellrte rmages but
feels that m order to be rr a position to deal urth
geopolrtrcal rnstabrlih' ln the Far East, and
partrcularlv developments on the Korean pemnsula.
an rrdependent data-gathenng system is necessan,.
l2l. A currcnt of opruon in favour of an
rndependent reconnalsszurcc satellite has exsted for
some trme wrthin the Agency', as there has alwal,s
been a fear that if tension mounted rn the Far East,
acc€ss to vital rntelligence mrght not be possrble
rvhen it was most needed.
122. The issue is further comphcated b1' a
resolution on the peaceful use of space adopted b1'
the Dret rn 1969, xherebl'space carurot be used for
mrlrtan'purposes. This resoluilon had untrl recently
acted as a deterrent to an1, mlitary satellitc
procurement rrutratrve. However, from 1994, lugh-
dcfirutron rmage tcchnologr', developed rn the Uruted
States for the Strategrc Defence kuflative, started to
become avarlable m part for cinlian applicatrons,
thus enhancrng commerclal satellite capabilities.
123 Under the circumstances. the Defence
Agency seems to feel tlnt the larurch of a satellite
for mrlitary use, prol,rdrng a senlce and results
srmrlar to those of cilrl satellites, need not rarse
issues of principle Everythrng u'ould seem to
indrcate that the Agency xrshes to firm up the
project for three-phase rmplementation as follous
first, conrance the govemment that procurement b1,
the Agency of a recomalssance satellrte urth
functions srmrlar to those of cir.rl satellrtes does not
nfnnge either the principle of peaceful use of space
or the purelv defensive arms of the Agency; second,
stud1' the hpe of satellrte required, the ground
station functrons and launch systems, and last,
rnclude the launch rn the nerl medium-term military
procurement plan, begrnmng ur 2000 and endrng rn
2005
124. The debate has also been taken up by the
Liberal Democratic Party. Thus sectrons of the
Japanese press rcported on 16 May 1996 that the
paq's Foreign Affarrs and Secunty Committees
had held a Jomt meeturg at rrfuch representatives of
the Agency and satellitc manufacturers had been
rmted to give their opuuons on u'hether Japan
needed to have rts o\\r satellrte svstem for
lnformation-gathering for nulitan' purposes.
125. At the meeting, the satellite manufacturcrs
made the pornt that the development, production and
launch of a "sp\'" satellite could take up to eight
vears and that the cost of the satellite, plus a second,
back-up satellrte. a data-relav test satellite (DRTS)
and a ground station. could come to about 200
bilhon ven Thcy' also emphasised that Japan had
the necessan' tcchnologv to undertake the
programme on rts oun.
126 On 19 May. the Nrhon Kerza Shtmbun
reported that ur order to obtain more accurate
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rrformatron on the military situatron in neighbouring
countnes. the Defence Agencl' \'as prepanng to
sign contracts with American firms able to recelve
sharper satellrte images than the Landsat mages the
Agency'had been usrng. Ttus was regarded as a
first step torvards the Agency acquirurg its own
satellrte. Lastly, rt made referencc, this time more
openll', to the fear that rr trmes of cnsis u'hen Japan
was most rn need of nformatron, the Uruted States
Govemment mrght, for reasons of natronal securitv,
restnct foreign sales of crul satellite rmages 
- 
a
situation u,tuch had affected many countnes during
the GulfWar
127. On 22 Mav. the Japanese Upper House ur
full sesslon passed a larv estabhsh:ng a new
Intelligence Departrnent rn the Jourt Staff Councrl,
to strengthen military rntelligence-gathering. This
provrded for the establishment the follou.rng
January of the Defence Intelligence Headquarters,
urth a staff of I 600 people engaged in nuhtary
rntelhgence-gathering and anall'sis. On the same
day the datly Asahi reported that the Defence
Agencl'had agreed urth the Pentagon that the latter
uould supply the Agency wrth military satellitc data
givrng earlv wamrng in the event of ballistic mrssile
attack. Ttus could also mean that the United States
would speed up development of a theatre mrssrle
defence (TMD) system n parbrerstup with Japan
128 Lastly', lt rs mterestmg to note rn the context
of drscussions on the 1997 budget that the Mrnister
for Foreigrr Affars has asked for the mclusion of a
sum of l0 nulhon y,cn. to begur a study on possible
procurcment of observatron satellites.
129. ln short, the process u'hereby' Japan is to
become selfsufficient rn observatron technology' for
defcnce purposes rn the near future, has reached a
stage w'here political decisions are rmmrnent Tlus
bemg so, rutial talks, followed later by possrble
cooperation between Europe and Japan should
certaurly not be ruled out and, mdeed, should be
neu'ed as a goal to be pursued.
130. At a trne when three European countnes,
France, Italy' and Spaur, are working together on
Hehos I n a hghly satrsfactory way uith Germany
hkely to lorr them m u'ork on Helios II, when plans
for cooperatron m Gcrmanv's Horus radar satellrte
prograrnme are startmg to take shape and, firnlly,
when WEU is givurg thought to its urvolvement in
the European multurational project, it does not seem
at all far-fetched that there should, m the first
umtanco, be an exchange of ideas wrth a country
such as Japan, wtuch appears to have the same
overall needs as Europe rn terms of nulrtary
observation.
131. ln I'our Rapporteur's opimon, dralogue urth
Japan is possrble, therefore, on a shared needs basis,
and need not be rcstncted to polrtrcal and nulitarv
issues but mrght also take rn rndustry and
technology.
132. In todav's lvorld, uith the cold war over and
50 years on from the second world lrar, it does not
seem reasonable to perpetuate situations preventurg
or hrndcnng nations from cooperaturg freely,
partrcularly on matters x'here the arm rs to ensure
urtematronal peace and secunq'.
W. Conclusions
133. Europe and Japan have the shared arm of
usurg space for peaceful purposes, rn partrcular to
guarantee rntemational stabihty and sccunty The
srmrlantres between them go beyond thc urterests
they' have in common. extendrng to their budgets
and space development priontles.
I34. Space development rn recent years has been
spectacular ur both Europe and Japan, but has
unfortunately not gone hand rr hand urth the mutual
cooperahon that mght have been of equal benefit to
both. In your Rapporteur's vieu', the problems,
essentially of a political nature, come mainly from
the Japanese srde, and are the result of pressure
because of Uruted States commercnl mterests.
135 However, the trme has now come to
surmount all the obstacles preventurg cooperation or
holdrng rt back. This can be actueved through a
dralogue that is devoid ofpreconceptions about our
common political, economic, technological,
rrdustnal and commercial rnterests rr both the
crulnn and nulitary spheres A senes of rvhat your
Rapporteur regards as feasible, down-to-earth
proposals are contamed in the draft recommendatron
that prefaces tlus study'. They are rntended as the
first steps torvards cooperatron between Europe and
Japan
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